

Title: REVISITING LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD S. EWELL'S DECISION NOT TO ATTACK CEMETERY HILL ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG: A STUDY VIEWED THROUGH THE THEORETICAL LENSES OF SUN TZU, ANTOINE JOMINI, AND THE US ARMY FIELD MANUAL 3.0, C1

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For over 150 years General Richard S. Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg has been debated. For 130 of those years, Ewell was vilified and berated as a hesitant, vacillating, and timid corps commander who was paralyzed by indecision. It was not until the last decade of the 20th century that it seemed that the Second Corps commander had finally been vindicated for his decision not to assault Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. However, the 21st century witnessed a historian who presented an absolute indictment of the lieutenant general. Essentially, the literature review had come full circle. After over 150 years of debate, we find ourselves, as researchers, right back where we started and no closer to a definitive conclusion as to Ewell's actions on July 1, 1863, until now.

The real problem is that everyone appears to have an opinion on this subject, some are good and some are not so good. What was needed was a standard set of military principles to determine if Ewell's actions were reasonable given the circumstances on the first day of the battle. This study has identified 8 combined military leadership principles and two "Units of Meaning" based upon the theories of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3.0, C1. The combined military leadership principles and the "Units of Meaning" listed above encompass 2,500 years of military thought. This qualitative historical narrative identified

leadership, clarity of orders, concentration, terrain, maneuver, offensive operations, defensive operations, and intelligence as combined military leadership principles and security and Initiative as “Units of Meaning”. Their application to Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, provided a far more objective conclusion in determining if Ewell acted reasonably on that fateful July afternoon and evening in 1863. This study consulted all relevant primary and secondary data as well as *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Union and Confederate Armies*, and the US Army Heritage and Education Center at the US Army War College, the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, the *Gordon Family Papers*, several published volumes of Ewell’s letters, memoirs, biographies, references, books, narratives, internet sources, and periodicals

The research indicated that contrary to the arguments of Ewell critics, the lieutenant general’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1 was reasonable. In fact, the Second Corps commander followed 88% of the combined military leadership principles and “Units of Meaning” of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and USAFM on July 1, 1863. This study refuted or questioned the motives of many of Ewell’s most ardent detractors and recommended further study on General A. P. Hill’s culpability on July 1, and an application of the combined military leadership principles and “Units of Meaning” to General Robert E. Lee’s actions for the entire three day battle. Moreover, further study might reveal the effects of Lee’s refusal to commit Richard Anderson’s Division and several of Dorsey Pender’s Brigades on July 1, 1863.

